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Calls for Speculation: An Experimental 
Examination of Juror Perceptions of 
Attorney Objections 
KRYSTIA REED† 
ABSTRACT 
Should attorneys object during trial? Does preserving the record 
outweigh the potential costs of objections, such as upsetting the jury 
or drawing attention to the evidence? Legal scholars have opined on 
the delicate balance attorneys must strike in their decisions to 
object, but researchers have offered little to guide attorneys making 
these in-the-moment decisions. I discuss results from two empirical 
studies that provide evidence that attorneys have less to fear from 
objections than legal scholars suggest. Based on these results, I 
provide suggestions for practicing attorneys. 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are defending a client in a criminal trial. 
While examining one of the witnesses, the prosecution brings 
up evidence of the defendant’s prior criminal record. The 
defendant is not on the stand, and the use of the evidence in 
this context clearly violates the rules of evidence in your 
 
† Krystia Reed, J.D., Ph.D. is a National Science Foundation Post-Doctoral 
Associate at Cornell Law School. Preparation of this article was funded by 
National Science Foundation grant SES-1536238: “Quantitative Judgments in 
Law: Studies of Damage Award Decision Making” to Valerie P. Hans and Valerie 
F. Reyna. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed 
in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the National Science Foundation. 
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jurisdiction.1 You also believe that this evidence is unfairly 
prejudicial to your client. What do you do? Do you object? Do 
you ask the judge to instruct the jury to disregard the 
evidence? Or do you sit there and do nothing, fearing that 
objecting would have its own negative consequences and 
praying that the jurors were sleeping and did not hear the 
evidence? 
The decision is likely not straightforward. Your decision 
probably takes into account a number of factors: the 
likelihood the judge will sustain the objection; how the 
objection will influence the jury’s perception of you, your 
client, and the evidence; and preservation of the record and 
your ability to appeal the case.2 In fact, some legal scholars 
are concerned that trial attorneys are forced to decide 
between objecting and losing at trial or not objecting and 
losing on appeal.3 To further complicate the situation, 
attorneys must make this decision immediately4 and with 
very little guidance beyond legal folklore.5 
In this Article, I report the results of two studies 
empirically investigating the impact of objections on juror 
verdicts, perceptions of the attorneys, and memory for 
 
 1. Evidence of the defendant’s character, including criminal history, is not 
admissible to prove that the defendant acted in accordance with that character 
in terms of the specific crime. FED. R. EVID. 404. Although the Federal Rules of 
Evidence (FRE) only apply in federal court, this review will focus on evidentiary 
rules under the FRE for the sake of simplicity since many jurisdictions have 
similar rules. 
 2. See infra Part I for a discussion of the costs and benefits of objecting; see 
also Krystia Reed & Brian H. Bornstein, Objection! Psychological Perspectives on 
Jurors’ Perceptions of In-Court Attorney Objections, 63 S.D. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2018). 
 3. Christine R. Davis, Striking a Balance to Win: Balancing the Need to Win 
the Trial with the Need to Preserve the Record on Appeal, 81 FLA. B.J. 18, 21–22 
(2007). 
 4. FED. R. EVID. 103 (requiring timely objections at risk of waiver). 
 5. Beyond FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B) and the general guidance offered by the 
FRE or other statutes, attorneys are given no specific rules for objecting. 
Attorneys may learn objection strategy during law school or another course (e.g., 
Continuing Legal Education courses), but mostly they must figure out when to 
object based on their own experience or mentorship from other attorneys. 
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evidence. In Part I, I introduce the research on the influence 
of objections on jurors. In Part II, I briefly describe the study 
methodologies, and report and interpret the results. Finally, 
in Part III, I explore the implications of the results and 
discuss why attorneys should be less fearful of objecting than 
legal commentators may suggest. 
I. OBJECTIONS 
During trial, objections are the primary way in which an 
attorney can enforce evidentiary rules; when an evidentiary 
rule is violated, the opposing attorney can object and request 
some form of redress.6 Attorneys can object to procedure-
based violations or content-based violations,7 but both types 
of objections must state the grounds for objection8 and must 
be timely.9 Thus, rules of evidence may provide attorneys 
with some guidance on when they can object, but attorneys 
must decide whether (and when) they should object instance-
by-instance during trial by balancing the costs against the 
benefits. 
A. Legal Cost-Benefit Balancing Act 
There are many benefits to timely objections. One of the 
 
 6. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 1.3 (5th 
ed. 2012). 
 7. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 3–5 for a discussion of the types of 
objections. 
 8. The FRE require that attorneys state “the specific ground, unless it was 
apparent from the context.” FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(B). 
 9. FED R. EVID. 103. The court is only permitted to take notice of untimely 
objections, or claims of error not properly preserved, if there is “plain error 
affecting a substantial right.” FED. R. EVID. 103(e); see also Glenn E. Bradford & 
James R. Wyrsch, Making the Record in the Trial Court, 64 J. MO. B. 284, 284–
85, 288 (2008) (discussing the consequences of untimely). This typically results in 
two opportunities for attorneys to object—during trial or before trial (i.e., through 
a motion in limine). See Charles W. Gamble, The Motion in Limine: A Pretrial 
Procedure that Has Come of Age, 33 ALA. L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1981) (explaining motions 
in limine are procedural mechanisms used before trial to prevent the opposing 
party and witnesses from using prejudicial evidence). See Reed & Bornstein, 
supra note 2, at 5, for a discussion of timing. 
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most important benefits is that a sustained objection can 
correct an error immediately. If the objection is sustained 
before the evidence is introduced, attorneys can block the 
jury from ever hearing the unfavorable inadmissible 
evidence.10 If the objection is sustained after the evidence is 
introduced, the attorney can request the jury be instructed 
to disregard or limit the evidence.11 Alternatively, even if the 
objection is overruled, a timely objection preserves the record 
so the attorney can appeal the decision.12 In addition to these 
well-known benefits, some scholars also argue that 
objections present attorneys an additional opportunity to 
make persuasive arguments that sway the jury.13 
On the other hand, legal scholars also advise that 
objecting can have serious consequences. One major concern 
is that objecting can alienate the jury.14 Additionally, 
 
 10. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403 (allowing the court to exclude relevant evidence 
if there is a risk of unfair prejudice); see also JOHN H. BLUME & EMILY C. PAAVOLA, 
OBJECTION HANDBOOK 2 (2008), http://www.lawschool.cornell.edu/ 
research/death-penalty-project/upload/objection-20handbook.pdf; Christopher C. 
vanNatta & Timothy J. Cothrel, The Object of My Objection, 33 LITIG. 26, 28–29 
(2006) (explaining when to object). 
 11. The typical remedy is a curative instruction or a judicial admonition to 
the jury to disregard the evidence. Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror 
Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-
Analysis, 30 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2006). This outcome is far less desirable 
than having the objection sustained prior to the evidence being discussed. 
Research demonstrates that jurors are unable to completely disregard 
inadmissible evidence when instructed to do so. Id. at 475, 486 (discussing the 
results from a meta-analysis summarizing 48 studies on the topic). 
 12. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 3, at 21. Again, this result is often less ideal 
than having the objection sustained prior to the evidence being discussed since 
cases are rarely overturned on appeal. Statistics from 2015 indicate that 8.3% of 
cases were reversed on appeal. TABLE B-5. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS—
DECISIONS IN CASES TERMINATED ON THE MERITS, BY CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF 
PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING SEPTEMBER 30, 2015, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/b-5/judicial-business/2015/09/30 (last 
visited Aug. 23, 2018). This is the highest rate since 2012. Reed & Bornstein, 
supra note 2, at 7 n.47. 
 13. Edward D. Ohlbaum, Jacob’s Voice, Esau’s Hands: Evidence-Speak for 
Trial Lawyers, 31 STETSON L. REV. 7, 9–10 (2001). 
 14. Davis, supra note 3, at 21–22; Steven Lubet, Objecting, 16 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 213, 219 (1992); see also MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 6, at 9; Fred 
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scholars opine that objecting can potentially draw more 
attention to the evidence the attorney is attempting to 
suppress.15 Both of these concerns are not insignificant; 
however, little is known about their validity. 
B. The Psychology of Objecting 
The majority of psycholegal research on objections 
relates to inadmissible evidence. Generally, these studies 
focus on one piece of critical testimony that is challenged as 
inadmissible.16 Researchers compare juror perceptions in 
three situations: critical testimony that is objected to and 
admitted (admit); critical testimony that is objected to and 
ruled inadmissible (disregard); and no critical testimony or 
objections (control).17 Results indicate that jurors are unable 
to disregard evidence completely; jurors in the disregard 
condition rely on the critical testimony significantly less than 
jurors in the admit condition, but significantly more than 
jurors in the control condition who never heard the 
testimony.18 Moreover, research indicates that in some 
instances, judicial instructions to disregard evidence can 
even backfire and result in jurors relying more on the critical 
testimony.19 
 
Warren Bennett, Preserving Issues for Appeal: How to Make a Record at Trial, 18 
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 87, 87 (1994). 
 15. Steblay et al., supra note 11, at 487. But see Molly Juliann Walker Wilson, 
Objecting to Objections: The Paradoxical Consequences of Courtroom 
Interruptions, 53 (Jan. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Virginia) (on file with author). 
 16. See Steblay et al., supra note 11, for a meta-analysis summarizing the 
results of 48 of these types of studies. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. For example, mock jurors instructed to disregard evidence about a 
defendant’s prior conviction rendered more guilty verdicts than mock jurors who 
heard the information without an instruction. Kerri L. Pickel, Inducing Jurors to 
Disregard Inadmissible Evidence: A Legal Explanation Does Not Help, 19 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 407, 407 (1995). See also Michele Cox & Sarah Tanford, Effects of 
Evidence and Instructions in Civil Trials: An Experimental Investigation of Rules 
of Admissibility, 4 SOC. BEHAV. 31, 31 (1989); Geoffrey P. Kramer et al., Pretrial 
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Thus, the primary focus of these studies is the critical 
testimony—objections are only used as a mechanism for 
manipulating the admissibility of the critical testimony. 
Only one study by Wilson includes a fourth condition of 
critical testimony admitted without an objection,20 and none 
of the studies include a fifth condition of objection without 
critical testimony. Findings from Wilson’s study indicate 
that the objections are important—participants were 
significantly more likely to render a guilty verdict when 
critical testimony is ruled admissible following an objection 
than when it is ruled inadmissible at the end of the trial with 
no objection.21 Therefore, the current understanding of how 
objections influence jurors is virtually inseparable from our 
understanding of inadmissible evidence, even though they 
are very different conceptually. 
Although there is little empirical research directly 
investigating objections, there is general psychological 
research that can aid in our predictions. Objections could 
 
Publicity, Judicial Remedies, and Jury Bias, 14 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 430 
(1990); Sarah Tanford & Michele Cox, Decision Processes in Civil Cases: The 
Impact of Impeachment Evidence on Liability and Credibility Judgments, 2 SOC. 
BEHAV. 165, 165 (1987); Sharon Wolf & David A. Montgomery, Effects of 
Inadmissible Evidence and Level of Judicial Admonishment to Disregard on the 
Judgments of Mock Jurors, 7 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 205, 206–09 (1977). 
This is concerning because the goal of limiting instructions is to cure any 
prejudicial impact of questionable evidence by encouraging jurors to limit the use 
of certain evidence to admissible purposes or to completely disregard 
inadmissible evidence. See, e.g., Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299–303 (1981) 
(discussing that limiting instructions might not be a sufficient safeguard in 
practice). Some research indicates that limiting instructions can be effective. See 
generally W. R. Cornish & A. P. Sealy, L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules 
of Evidence, CRIM. L. REV. 208 (1973); Rita James Simon, Murder, Juries, and the 
Press, 3 TRANS-ACTION 40 (1966). However, the majority of research indicates that 
limiting instructions are ineffective. See Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, 
Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social Psychological 
Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and 
Other Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL., & L. 677 (2000) (explaining 
the ineffectiveness of limiting instructions). 
 20. Wilson, supra note 15, at 3. 
 21. Id. 
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influence jurors through many psychological routes.22 For 
the purpose of these studies, I will focus on how interruptions 
and attributions influence memory for evidence and 
perceptions of attorneys, both of which can influence the 
ultimate verdict. 
1. Memory for evidence 
Objections, by their nature, interrupt trial proceedings.23 
When an attorney objects, it temporarily halts the trial and 
disturbs the continuity of the other attorney or witness.24 
Interruptions change how people allocate attention and 
remember information;25 however, the effect is complicated 
and depends on several factors. Some researchers have found 
that interruptions increase attentional demands,26 resulting 
in information overload that increases confusion and 
decreases memory.27 In other studies, researchers have 
found that interruptions draw attention to stimuli and 
 
 22. For a more complete review of psychological factors that might explain the 
impact of objections on jurors, see Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2. 
 23. Wilson, supra note 15, at 9; see also Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 
12–23. Interruption is defined as “incidents or occurrences that impede or 
delay . . . progress on [a task].” Quintus R. Jett & Jennifer M. George, Work 
Interrupted: A Closer Look at the Role of Interruptions in Organizational Life, 28 
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 494, 494 (2003). Researchers have identified four types of 
interruptions: intrusions, breaks, distractions, and discrepancies. Id. Objections 
are most similar to intrusions, so that will be the focus of this section. Reed & 
Bornstein, supra note 2, at 12–13. 
 24. An objection is “[t]he act of a party who objects to some matter or 
proceeding in the course of a trial, or an argument or reason urged by him in 
support of his contention that the matter or proceeding objected to is improper or 
illegal. Used to call the court’s attention to improper evidence or procedure. Such 
objections in open court are important so that such will appear on the record for 
purposes of appeal.” Objection, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979). 
 25. Timo Mäntylä & Teresa Sgaramella, Interrupting Intentions: Zeigarnik-
like Effects in Prospective Memory, 60 PSYCHOL. RES. 192, 197 (1997). 
 26. Chris Eccleston & Geert Crombez, Pain Demands Attention: A Cognitive-
Affective Model of the Interruptive Function of Pain, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 356, 356 
(1999); Seth Geiger & Byron Reeves, We Interrupt This Program . . . Attention for 
Television Sequences, 19 HUM. COMM. RES. 368, 368 (1993). 
 27. James T. Milord & Raymond P. Perry, A Methodological Study of 
Overload, 97 J. GEN. PSYCHOL. 131, 131 (1977). 
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improve memory.28 Other researchers suggest that attention 
and memory only increase when the interruption is similar 
in content to the interrupted material.29 Yet, other 
researchers find that interruptions are most memorable 
when they are distinct, unusual, or stand out in some way.30 
Objections in a trial may also influence memory for 
evidence beyond these basic effects of interruptions by 
disrupting jurors’ story construction. Pennington and Hastie 
 
 28. See JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS 
HAPPEN 5 (2009) (discussing task processing); Robert S. Baron, Distraction-
Conflict Theory: Progress and Problems, 19 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 1, 3–10 (1986) (discussing distraction-conflict theory); Jean-Marie 
Cellier & Hélène Eyrolle, Interference Between Switched Tasks, 35 ERGONOMICS 
25, 33–34 (1992) (discussing results of study assessing interruptions and task 
accuracy); Noah Schiffman & Suzanne Greist-Bousquet, The Effect of Task 
Interruption and Closure on Perceived Duration, 30 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC. 9, 
9–10 (1992) (studying the effect of interruptions on problem-solving time). 
 29. See Mäntylä & Sgaramella, supra note 25, at 192–93 (explaining the study 
in which researchers manipulated whether they interrupted a task with an 
anagram activity, and when the task was interrupted, participants displayed 
enhanced prospective memory performance). For example, distractors are less 
likely to decrease memory for word pairs when the words are meaningfully 
linked. James J. Jenkins, Remember that Old Theory of Memory? Well, Forget It!, 
29 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 785, 792 (1974); Norman J. Slamecka, Differentiation 
Versus Unlearning of Verbal Associations, 71 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 822, 822 
(1966). 
 30. Research on memory indicates that people have better memory for 
unusual information than for common information, which is known as the 
distinctiveness effect. See generally Alan D. Baddeley & Graham Hitch, The 
Recency Effect: Implicit Learning with Explicit Retrieval?, 21 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 146 (1993); R. Reed Hunt, The Concept of Distinctiveness in Memory 
Research, in DISTINCTIVENESS AND MEMORY 3, 3 (R. Reed Hunt & James B. 
Worthen eds., 2006); Larry L. Jacoby & Fergus I. M. Craik, Effects of Elaboration 
of Processing at Encoding and Retrieval: Trace Distinctiveness and Recovery of 
Initial Context, in LEVELS OF PROCESSING IN HUMAN MEMORY 1 (Laird S. Cermak 
& Fergus I. M. Craik eds., 1979); Anjali Thapar & Robert L. Greene, Evidence 
Against a Short-Term-Store Account of Long-Term Recency Effects, 21 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 329 (1993); Paula J. Waddill & Mark A. McDaniel, Distinctiveness 
Effects in Recall: Differential Processing or Privileged Retrieval?, 26 MEMORY & 
COGNITION 108 (1998). But, distinctiveness is context-dependent. For example, 
seeing a giraffe on a school campus might be very distinct and memorable, while 
seeing the same giraffe in a zoo would be ordinary. Kathleen B. McDermott & 
Henry L. Roediger III, Memory (Encoding, Storage, Retrieval), in NOBA TEXTBOOK 
SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY (R. Biswas-Diener & E. Diener eds., 2019), 
http://nobaproject.com/modules/memory-encoding-storage-retrieval. 
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developed the story model of jury decision-making that 
explains jury decisions based on certain existing mental 
concepts.31 The story model hypothesizes that “jurors impose 
a narrative story organization on trial information, in which 
causal and intentional relations between events are 
central.”32 Attorneys and witnesses present evidence at trial 
in pieces, which jurors, like mystery novel readers, must 
then put together like a puzzle.33 Objections halt the 
testimony and narrative, and can therefore alter the story 
jurors construct.34 
Thus, it is possible that objections do influence jurors’ 
memories of the evidence, but could do so in many ways. 
Objections might overload jurors and decrease their memory 
or direct jurors’ attention to the evidence like a spotlight and 
increase their memory. Moreover, other factors might drive 
the effect. If similarity is important, objections that are 
similar in content to the testimony might increase memory, 
while unrelated interruptions might decrease memory. If 
distinctiveness is important, infrequent objections or 
objections that are strange in content might be more 
memorable than frequent or ordinary objections. Wilson’s 
study on objections indirectly supports this distinctiveness 
 
 31. In psychology these existing mental concepts are known as schemas. See 
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence Evaluation in Complex Decision 
Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 242, 243 (1986) [hereinafter 
Pennington & Hastie I]; Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the 
Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 189, 192 (1992) [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie II]. 
 32. Pennington & Hastie I, supra note 31, at 243. 
 33. Id. 
 34. There is currently no research investigating how interruptions influence 
story construction, but it is possible that objections can result in less complete 
and less powerful stories. Story model research indicates that jurors are less 
influenced by less complete stories. Pennington & Hastie II, supra note 31, at 
202. On the other hand, research on story construction indicates that jurors will 
fill-in-the-blanks following interruptions, suggesting that objections might not 
have much impact on story construction, particularly if the testimony is not 
completely barred. See id. at 197 (suggesting that if the testimony is barred and 
the objection prevents delivery of some information, it could impact the 
completeness of the narratives jurors develop). 
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theory,35 but research has not empirically tested these 
theories directly. The two studies I present in this paper 
represent the first attempt at empirically testing these 
theories directly. 
2. Perceptions of attorneys 
Although evidence tends to be the most influential factor 
on verdicts,36 jurors’ perceptions of the people involved in the 
case can also have an influence. For example, an attorney’s 
gender,37 attractiveness,38 race,39 and personality40 all 
influence verdicts beyond the evidence. Objections, therefore, 
could influence verdicts by altering jurors’ perceptions of the 
objecting attorney. 
 
 35. Wilson, supra note 15, at 3–4. The study focused on only one piece of 
inadmissible testimony. In both conditions, jurors heard the same evidence and 
were told to disregard it, but the instruction to disregard was either immediate 
and preceded by an objection, or was delayed until the end of trial with no 
objection during trial. Mock jurors were less able to disregard the evidence if 
there was an immediate objection and instruction than if there was no objection 
and a delayed instruction. 
 36. EDIE GREENE ET AL., WRIGHTSMAN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 
289 (6th ed. 2007). 
 37. Peter W. Hahn & Susan D. Clayton, The Effects of Attorney Presentation 
Style, Attorney Gender, and Juror Gender on Juror Decisions, 20 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 533, 533 (1996); Mary Stewart Nelson, The Effect of Attorney Gender on 
Jury Perception and Decision-Making, 28 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 177, 177 (2004); 
Krystia Reed & Jennifer Groscup, Hot or Not? The Influence of Attorney 
Attractiveness and Gender on Juror Decision Making 2 (2010) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
 38. Jansen Voss, The Science of Persuasion: An Exploration of Advocacy and 
the Science Behind the Art of Persuasion in the Courtroom, 29 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 
301, 317 (2005); Reed & Groscup, supra note 37, at 2. 
 39. David S. Abrams & Albert H. Yoon, The Luck of the Draw: Using Random 
Case Assignment to Investigate Attorney Ability, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1145, 1145 
(2007); Russ K. E. Espinoza & Cynthia Willis-Esqueda, Defendant and Defense 
Attorney Characteristics and Their Effects on Juror Decision Making and 
Prejudice Against Mexican Americans, 14 CULTURAL DIVERSITY & ETHNIC 
MINORITY PSYCHOL. 364, 364 (2008). 
 40. Pamela Hobbs, ‘Is That What We’re Here About?’: A Lawyer’s Use of 
Impression Management in a Closing Argument at Trial, 14 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 
273, 276–77 (2003). 
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Every day, people make judgments, or attributions, 
about whether another person’s behavior is based upon their 
personality or the situation.41 These attributions are often 
automatic and biased.42 Although these attributions can be 
helpful, in the courtroom, jurors’ attributions can be 
prejudicial, and procedural evidentiary safeguards are 
typically insufficient protections.43 
Objections have the potential to influence several 
attributions that will negatively influence perceptions of the 
objecting attorney.44 For example, it is possible that 
objections will make it appear as if the attorney is trying to 
hide or distort information, which could result in jurors 
making attributions about the attorney’s personality and 
could potentially trigger existing stereotypes about attorneys 
being corrupt, greedy tricksters.45 Alternatively, it is possible 
that by objecting, jurors will determine that the objecting 
 
 41. There are several theoretical models describing how attributions are 
made. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 24–28 for a review of attributions 
and their relation to objections. 
 42. Humans typically are not rational actors and often rely on a single, quick 
explanation rather than searching all evidence to find the best possible 
explanation for a behavior. SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL 
COGNITION: FROM BRAINS TO CULTURE 219 (Luke Block ed., Sage Publications 3d 
ed. 2017) (2008). 
 43. Attributions about different trial participants, such as victims and 
defendants, influence verdicts. There is a strong negative correlation between 
victim blame and verdict. See generally Gloria J. Fischer, Effects of Drinking by 
the Victim or Offender on Verdicts in a Simulated Trial of an Acquaintance Rape, 
77 PSYCHOL. REP. 579 (1995); Yael Idisis et al., Attribution of Blame to Rape 
Victims among Therapists and Non-Therapists, 25 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 103 (2007); 
B. J. Rye et al., The Case of the Guilty Victim: The Effects of Gender of Victim and 
Gender of Perpetrator on Attributions of Blame and Responsibility, 54 SEX ROLES 
639 (2006). 
 44. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 26–28 for a more complete 
discussion of attributions about attorneys. 
 45. LEO J. SHAPIRO, A.B.A SEC. LITIG., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF LAWYERS 
CONSUMER RESEARCH FINDINGS (2002), https://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/public_perception_
of_lawyers_2002.authcheckdam.pdf; Valerie P. Hans & Krista Sweigart, Jurors’ 
Views of Civil Lawyers: Implications for Courtroom Communication, 68 IND. L. J. 
1297, 1327 (1993). 
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attorney is verbally aggressive,46 triggering negative general 
perceptions.47 
Jurors’ attributions about objecting attorneys might vary 
based on the attorneys’ gender. Society tends to have 
different expectations for men than women;48 men are 
expected to be more agentic, controlling, and independent, 
while women are expected to be more communal, emotionally 
expressive, and interpersonally sensitive.49 People who 
violate these gender expectations typically suffer negative 
backlash from others,50 including women who are perceived 
as too masculine professionally.51 Furthermore, female 
jurors who express the masculine characteristic of anger lose 
credibility, while angry male jurors gain credibility.52 If 
objections are perceived as an assertive, masculine 
characteristic,53 jurors might have more negative 
perceptions of objecting female attorneys than objecting male 
attorneys; if objections are perceived as a method of 
 
 46. Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 21–22. 
 47. Valerie Cryer Downs et al., The Impact of Argumentativeness and Verbal 
Aggression on Communicator Image: The Exchange between George Bush and 
Dan Rather, 54 W.J. SPEECH COMM. 99, 102 (1990); Dominic A. Infante & Charles 
J. Wigley, Verbal Aggressiveness: An Interpersonal Model and Measure, 53 COMM. 
MONOGRAPHS 61, 61 (1986). 
 48. This is known as social role theory. ALICE H. EAGLY, SEX DIFFERENCES IN 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: A SOCIAL-ROLE INTERPRETATION 7 (1987). 
 49. Id. at 9–10. See generally Amy J. C. Cuddy et al., When Professionals 
Become Mothers, Warmth Doesn’t Cut the Ice, 60 J. SOC. ISSUES 701 (2004); 
Rosanna E. Guadagno & Robert B. Cialdini, Gender Differences in Impression 
Management in Organizations: A Qualitative Review, 56 SEX ROLES 483 (2007). 
 50. Laurie A. Rudman, Self-Promotion as a Risk Factor for Women: The Costs 
and Benefits of Counterstereotypical Impression Management, 74 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 629, 629 (1998). 
 51. At work, women who are too agentic, dominant, self-promotional, or take 
on a leadership role might suffer workplace discrimination. See, e.g., Susan T. 
Fiske et al., Social Science Research on Trial: Use of Sex Stereotyping Research 
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1049, 1050–51 (1991). 
 52. See generally Jessica M. Salenro & Liana C. Peter-Hagene, One Angry 
Woman: Anger Expressions Increases Influence for Men but Decreases Influence 
for Women, During Group Deliberation, 39 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 581 (2015). 
 53. See Reed & Bornstein, supra note 2, at 23–24. 
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advocating for one’s client, jurors might have less negative 
perceptions of objecting female attorneys than objecting male 
attorneys.54 Thus, I designed the two studies presented 
below specifically to assess whether objecting negatively 
influences jurors’ perceptions of the attorneys, and whether 
the effect varies based on attorney gender. 
II. THE CURRENT STUDIES: THE EFFECT OF OBJECTIONS ON 
MOCK JURORS 
I conducted two studies that empirically test the validity 
of concerns about objections negatively influencing jurors. In 
both studies, mock jurors listened to an audio trial of an 
armed robbery case. Some jurors heard the trial without 
interruptions, while others heard it with interruptions or 
objections. After listening to the trial, jurors rendered a 
verdict, rated the attorneys, and answered questions about 
their memory for the evidence. Given attorney concerns and 
psychological research, I predicted that objections would 
negatively influence mock juror verdicts, perceptions of the 
attorneys, and memory for evidence.55 
A. Study 1: Objections and Interruptions 
The first study investigated whether objections are 
psychologically similar to other interruptions during trial. 
Two-hundred and sixty-two mock jurors (132 
 
 54. See, e.g., Emily T. Amanatullah & Catherine H. Tinsley, Punishing 
Female Negotiators for Asserting Too Much . . . or Not Enough: Exploring Why 
Advocacy Moderates Backlash Against Assertive Female Negotiators, 120 ORG. 
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 110, 110 (2013) (finding no backlash against 
women engaging in negotiation for others). 
 55. These studies only included defense attorney objections, so directional 
hypotheses are based on the perspective of the defense attorney (i.e., negatively 
influence = fewer not guilty verdicts, higher prosecuting attorney ratings, lower 
defense attorney ratings, and better memory for evidence). For specific 
hypotheses, see Krystia Reed, Trial, Interrupted: Juror Perceptions of Attorney 
Objections (Dec. 2017) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln) (on file with author). 
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undergraduates and 130 community members)56 listened to 
the audio trial which varied the presence, type, and frequency 
of the interruptions57 or objections.58 
1. Presence of interruption/objection 
Initially, I tested whether the mere presence of an 
interruption mattered. Interruption presence influenced 
verdicts; however, contrary to concerns, interruptions 
resulted in more not guilty verdicts, which benefits the 
defense attorney.59 The presence of an interruption had no 
 
 56. Undergraduate students (Mage = 19.5, 74.2% female, 78% white) were 
recruited from the psychology department participant pool at a large Midwestern 
university and were compensated with course credit. Community members 
(Mage = 35.5, 35% female, 72% white) were recruited using TurkPrime and were 
compensated with $6. TurkPrime is a research platform integrating Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) with social science research methods. See Leb Litman 
et al., TurkPrime.com: A Versatile Crowdsourcing Data Acquisition Platform for 
the Behavioral Sciences, 49 BEHAV. RES. METHODS 433, 433 (2017) (reviewing 
TurkPrime); see also Michael Buhrmester et al., Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: A 
New Source of Inexpensive, Yet High-Quality Data, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 3 
(2011) (reviewing MTurk); Kristin Firth et al., Law and Psychology Grows Up, 
Goes Online, and Replicates, 15 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 320, 333–55 (2018) (for 
a comparison of MTurk data to other community samples in psychology-law 
research). 
 57. Legally-irrelevant interruptions included ringing cell phones (infrequent: 
1; frequent: 2), church bells (infrequent & frequent: 1), construction noises 
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 10), sneezing (infrequent & frequent: 1), and coughing 
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 1). Each legally-irrelevant interruption was followed by 
a judicial comment to parallel judicial comments following objections. 
 58. Objections included hearsay (infrequent: 2; frequent: 5), narrative 
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 3), relevance (infrequent & frequent: 1), speculation 
(infrequent: 0; frequent: 2), leading (infrequent: 0; frequent: 1), asked and 
answered (infrequent: 0; frequent: 1), and argumentative (infrequent: 0; 
frequent: 2). Each objection was followed by a judicial ruling (66% overruled, 33% 
sustained), but because this was not a study of inadmissible evidence, the 
evidence did not change based on judicial ruling, and the jury was never 
instructed to disregard any evidence. 
 59. See infra Figure 1. See infra Table 1 for results of the hierarchical logistic 
regression. Note, however, that there was an interaction between interruption 
and sample. Overall, interruptions resulted in more not guilty verdicts, but the 
pattern was different for students than community members. In the interruption 
condition, students and community members voted not guilty at similar rates; in 
the no interruption condition students voted not guilty less than in the 
interruption condition while community members voted not guilty more than in 
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effect on the ratings of either attorney.60 Mock jurors who 
heard the interrupted trial also had better memory for 
evidence presented after the interruption (“after 
evidence”);61 there was no difference in memory for evidence 
presented before the interruption (“before evidence”).62 
Thus, the presence of the interruption did not influence 
jurors overall. It made no difference in attorney ratings or 
memory of after evidence. However, interruptions 
inconsistently influenced verdicts based on the audience, 
with interruptions resulting in better verdicts for the defense 
attorney with student mock jurors, but worse with 
community member mock jurors. 
 
the interruption condition. 
 60. See infra Figure 2. The fourteen questions about each attorney were 
combined into composite scores based on a factor analysis (consistent with Reed 
& Groscup, supra note 37) to create 4 ratings with high reliability: prosecuting 
attorney favorability (α = 0.88), prosecuting attorney aggressiveness (α = 0.75), 
defense attorney favorability (α = 0.91), and defense attorney aggressiveness 
(α = 0.77). There were no differences in any of the ratings based on interruption 
presence: prosecuting attorney favorability, F(1, 214) = 0.17, MSe = 0.89, p = 0.68; 
prosecuting attorney aggressiveness, F(1, 214) = 2.31, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.13; 
defense attorney favorability, F(1, 214) = 0.03, MSe = 0.92, p = 0.87; defense 
attorney aggressiveness, F(1, 214), MSe = 1.98, p = 0.37. Scores were measured on 
7-points scales with 7 being higher in the trait. 
 61. See infra Figure 3. Created by averaging the scores on five questions about 
evidence presented after the interruption (“after evidence”). F(1, 213) = 11.40, 
MSe = 0.62, p = 0.001 (interruptions: M = 3.58, SD = 0.78; control: M = 3.13, 
SD = 0.80). 
 62. See infra Figure 3. Created by averaging the scores on five questions about 
evidence presented before the interruption (M = 3.95, SD = 0.91). There was no 
difference based on interruption presence, F(1, 213) = 0.50, MSe = 0.82, p = 0.48, 
R2 < 0.01. 
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FIGURE 1. Percent not guilty verdicts by interruption 
presence in Study 1. 
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FIGURE 2. Attorney ratings based on interruption 
presence in Study 1. 
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FIGURE 3. Memory for evidence based on interruption 
presence in Study 1. 
 
 
2. Type of interruption or objection 
After identifying that the presence of an interruption 
influenced jurors, next I tested whether the type of 
interruption mattered—do objections influence jurors in the 
same way as interruptions? Contrary to attorney concerns, 
objections did not influence verdicts,63 attorney 
favorability,64 or memory for evidence65 any differently than 
legally-irrelevant interruptions. Interestingly, the 
 
 63. See infra Table 2 for results of the hierarchical logistic regression (not 
guilty verdicts—objection: 68.6%; interruption: 65.9%). 
 64. Prosecuting attorney favorability, F(1, 150) = 0.00, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.99; 
defense attorney favorability, F(1, 150) = 0.02, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.89. 
 65. Before evidence, F(1, 150) = 0.02, MSe = 0.79, p = 0.90 (percentage 
correct—objection: 80.2%; interruption: 80.2%); after evidence, F(1,150) = 1.98, 
MSe = 0.63, p = 0.16 (percentage correct—objection: 70.0%; interruption: 73.4%). 
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prosecuting attorney (who did not object) was rated as 
marginally more aggressive in the condition where the 
defense attorney objected;66 however, ratings of the defense 
attorney (who objected) aggressiveness were not different.67 
 
FIGURE 4. Attorney ratings based on interruption type in 
Study 1. 
 
 
Thus, objections are not operating substantially 
differently from other interruptions. Mock juror verdicts, 
ratings of the objecting attorney, and memory for the 
evidence were not worse when the trial was interrupted with 
an objection compared to a legally-irrelevant interruption. In 
fact, when the defense attorney objected, the prosecuting 
 
 66. F(1, 150) = 3.44, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.07. 
 67. See infra Figure 4. F(1, 150) = 0.47, MSe = 2.01, p = 0.50. 
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attorney was viewed as more aggressive.68 Objections did not 
harm the objecting defense attorney, and even helped the 
defense attorney by making the prosecutor appear more 
argumentative. 
3. Frequency of interruption or objection 
In order to determine if the distinctiveness of the 
interruption or objection mattered, I manipulated and 
analyzed the effect of interruption and objection frequency. 
Jurors rated the high frequency conditions as having more 
interruptions or objections69 and being more annoying70 than 
the low frequency conditions. Frequency did not influence 
verdicts,71 attorney favorability,72 or memory for evidence.73 
Again, the defense’s interruptions of the trial influenced 
perceptions of the prosecutor, who was rated as more 
aggressive in the high frequency conditions;74 however, 
 
 68. See supra Figure 4. 
 69. For defense attorneys: high frequency objections (M = 3.64, SD = 0.11) 
were rated as more frequent than low frequency objections (M = 2.46, SD = 0.10), 
F(1, 84) = 66.12, MSe = 0.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.44; high frequency interruptions 
(M = 4.05, SD = 0.11) were rated as more frequent than low frequency 
interruptions (M = 2.83, SD = 0.11), F(1, 83) = 65.31, MSe = 0.48, p < 0.001, 
R2 = 0.44. Interestingly, the prosecuting attorney who never objected was also 
rated as objecting significantly more in the high frequency defense objection 
condition (M = 3.64, SD = 0.11) than the low frequency (M = 2.46, SD = 0.10), 
F(1, 84) = 66.11, MSe = 0.46, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.44. This pattern did not occur in the 
control or interruption conditions, suggesting jurors might have source confusion 
and believe both attorneys are objecting. 
 70. Objections: F(1, 84) = 7.23 MSe = 3.16, p < 0.01, R2 = 0.08 (high frequency: 
M = 4.17, SD = 0.27; low frequency: M = 3.14, SD = 0.27); interruptions: F(1, 
82) = 42.24, MSe = 2.71, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.34 (high frequency: M = 6.02, SD = 0.25; 
low frequency: M = 3.69, SD = 0.25). 
 71. See infra Table 2 for logistic regression results (not guilty verdicts—low 
frequency: 66.3%; high frequency: 68.2%). 
 72. Prosecutor favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.08, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.78; defense 
favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.16, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.69. See infra Figure 5. 
 73. Before evidence: F(1, 150) = 1.73, MSe = 0.79, p = 0.19 (percentage 
correct—objection: 81.4%; interruption: 79.0%); after evidence: F(1, 150) = 1.30, 
MSe = 0.63, p = 0.26 (percentage correct—objection: 73.0%; interruption: 70.2%). 
 74. F(1, 150) = 4.38, MSe = 1.99, p = 0.04. 
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ratings of defense attorney (who did the interrupting) 
aggressiveness were not different.75 
 
FIGURE 5. Attorney ratings based on interruption 
frequency in Study 1. 
 
 
Consequently, the hypothesis that more distinct 
objections would be more influential was not supported—the 
frequency of the interruptions or objections did not make a 
difference. Jurors did find more interruptions to be more 
annoying, but only the prosecuting attorney was rated as 
more aggressive when he was interrupted more. There were 
no differences in ratings of defense attorney aggressiveness. 
It also should be noted that in the high frequency conditions, 
there were fifteen interruptions or objections in the 45-
 
 75. See infra Figure 5. F(1, 150) = 1.21, MSe = 2.01, p = 0.27. 
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minute audio trial. Although this was rated as high on the 
frequency scale for interruptions, for objections it was only 
in the middle of the frequency scale. Therefore, it is possible 
that jurors expect objections in the trial. Moreover, in the 
high frequency objection condition both the defense attorney 
and the prosecuting attorney (who never objected) were rated 
as objecting more frequently than in the low frequency 
objection condition, indicating there is some degree of juror 
confusion about which party is objecting. Consequently, it is 
possible that any negative effects of objecting could apply to 
both sides, and not just the party objecting. 
4. Attorney favorability 
Although Study 1 did not support attorney concerns that 
objections negatively impact jurors, results do emphasize 
that perceptions of the attorney are an important factor. For 
example, although interruption type and frequency had no 
effect, attorney favorability76 was one of the primary factors 
predicting differences in verdicts.77 Jurors who liked the 
prosecutor were more likely to vote guilty, while jurors who 
liked the defense attorney were more likely to vote not 
guilty.78 
 
 76. Attorney favorability included jurors’ ratings of attorney competence, 
trustworthiness, qualifications, professionalism, likeability, sincerity, 
confidence, and confidence in having the attorney represent the juror. See supra 
note 60 for a discussion of the specifics of calculating this variable and the 
reliability. 
 77. See infra Table 2 for logistic regression (with interruption type and 
frequency). Similar results occurred for interruption presence. See infra Table 1. 
 78. See infra Figure 6. For every one point increase in ratings of prosecuting 
attorney favorability, jurors were 88% less likely to vote not guilty (Figure 6a); 
for every one point increase in ratings of defense attorney favorability, jurors 
were 6.77 times more likely to vote not guilty (Figure 6b). Note this was a 
marginal main effect trending toward significant. See infra Table 2. 
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FIGURE 6. Verdict based on attorney rating in Study 1. 
 
 
B. Study 2: Objections and Attributions 
The second study further investigated whether objection 
frequency would influence mock jurors and whether the 
effect would differ based on attorney gender. One-hundred 
and fifty-two mock jurors79 listened to an audio trial that 
varied in objection frequency and defense attorney gender.80 
 
 79. Mock jurors (Mage = 38, 48% female, 82% white) were recruited via 
TurkPrime, randomly assigned to condition, and compensated with $6. See supra 
note 56 for a review of TurkPrime. Participants who did not correctly identify the 
gender of the attorneys or the defendant’s name (n = 32) were eliminated from 
analyses. 
 80. Study 2 focused only on objections (not legally irrelevant interruptions) 
and included high frequency, low frequency, and no objection conditions. 
Therefore, the resulting study design was a 3 (objection frequency: none v. 
frequent v. infrequent) x 2 (defense attorney gender: male v. female) between-
subjects experimental design, for 6 conditions. 
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1. Objection frequency 
As in Study 1, I manipulated the effect of objection 
frequency. Jurors again rated the high frequency condition 
as having more objections81 and being more annoying.82 
Frequency again did not influence verdict,83 perceptions of 
the attorneys (either favorability or aggressiveness),84 or 
memory for evidence.85 Consequently, attorney fears about 
objections were again unsupported in Study 2. 
2. Attorney gender 
In order to test the competing hypotheses about 
expectations of objecting female attorneys,86 half of the 
participants heard the trial with a male defense attorney and 
half heard the trial with a female defense attorney in Study 
2. Neither hypothesis was supported—attorney gender did 
not interact with objection frequency to influence verdict,87 
 
 81. For defense attorneys: high frequency objections (M = 3.55, SD = 0.75) 
were rated as most frequent followed by low frequent objections (M = 2.32, 
SD = 0.67) then no objections (M = 1.21, SD = 0.56) (ps < 0.001), F(2, 
117) = 53.13, MSe = 0.44, p < 0.001, R2 = 0.70. As in Study 1, the prosecuting 
attorney who never objected was also rated as objecting significantly more in the 
high frequency (M = 2.20, SD = 0.85) and low frequency (M = 2.03, SD = 0.69) 
conditions than the no objection control (M = 1.21, SD = 0.56), F(2, 114) = 9.15, 
MSe = 0.51, p < 0.01. Thus, even when only one attorney objects, jurors seem to 
be remembering both attorneys objecting. 
 82. F(1, 73) = 12.16, p < 0.01 (high frequency: M = 4.63, SD = 0.31; low 
frequency: M = 3.08, SD = 0.32). 
 83. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression results (not guilty verdicts—none: 
65.1%; low frequency: 75.7%; high frequency: 60.0%). 
 84. Prosecutor favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.08, MSe = 0.85, p = 0.78 (none: 
M = 5.26; low frequency: M = 5.08; high frequency: M = 5.11); defense 
favorability: F(1, 150) = 0.16, MSe = 1.97, p = 0.69 (none: M = 5.34; low frequency 
M = 5.20; high frequency M = 5.26). 
 85. Before evidence: F(2, 101) = 1.41, MSe = 0.77, p = 0.25; after evidence: F(2, 
101) = 0.00, MSe = 0.99, p = 0.99. 
 86. I.e., female attorneys will be punished if objections are perceived as an 
aggressive, masculine behavior, or rewarded if objections are perceived as a 
client-focused, feminine behavior. See EAGLY, supra note 48, for a discussion of 
gender role theory. 
 87. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression results. 
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perceptions of the attorneys,88 or memory for evidence89 at 
all. Therefore, objections by either male or female defense 
attorneys did not negatively influence jurors. Moreover, 
female attorneys were not penalized in general compared to 
male attorneys, contrary to prior research.90 
3. Attorney favorability 
Study 2 also did not support attorney concerns that 
objections negatively impact jurors, but the results further 
emphasize the importance of jurors’ perceptions of the 
attorney. Objection frequency and attorney gender did not 
influence verdicts, but attorney favorability was again a 
significant predictor of verdict.91 Jurors who liked the 
prosecutor were significantly more likely to vote guilty, while 
jurors who liked the defense attorney were significantly more 
likely to vote not guilty.92 
 
 88. Prosecuting attorney favorability: F(2, 101) = 1.01, MSe = 1.19, p = 0.37; 
defense attorney favorability: F(2, 101) = 1.40, MSe = 1.04, p = 0.25; prosecuting 
attorney aggressiveness: F(2, 101) = 0.16, MSe = 1.70, p = 0.85; defense attorney 
aggressiveness: F(2, 101) = 0.18, MSe = 2.42, p = 0.84. 
 89. Before evidence: F(2, 101) = 0.09, MSe = 0.77, p = 0.92; after evidence: F(2, 
101) = 1.44, MSe = 0.99, p = 0.24. 
 90. See, e.g., Hahn & Clayton, supra note 37, at 533; Nelson, supra note 37, 
at 177; Reed & Groscup, supra note 37. 
 91. See infra Table 3 for logistic regression. 
 92. See infra Figure 7. For every one-point increase in ratings of prosecuting 
attorney favorability, jurors were 90% less likely to vote not guilty (Figure 7a); 
for every one point increase in ratings of defense attorney favorability, jurors 
were 6.74 times more likely to vote not guilty (Figure 7b). See infra Table 3. 
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FIGURE 7. Verdict based on attorney rating in Study 2. 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Summary and Caveats 
The results of these two empirical studies demonstrate 
that attorneys may have less to fear from objections than 
scholars caution. General psychological research indicates 
that objections might influence memory for evidence93 and 
perceptions of attorneys,94 which are major components in 
verdicts; however, psycholegal research had yet to test these 
hypotheses. 
The present studies represent the first attempt to 
determine whether and how objections during trial influence 
jurors similarly to interruptions in the real world. Neither 
 
 93. See supra Section I.B.1. 
 94. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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Study 1 nor Study 2 supported the notion that objections 
affect jurors’ memory for evidence or favorability ratings of 
the attorneys. In fact, the only difference in perceptions of 
the attorneys was that objections made the non-objecting 
prosecutor appear more aggressive.95 Thus, objections did not 
negatively influence jurors, and if anything, had positive 
effects for the objecting attorney. 
Moreover, the present studies did not support the gender 
differences found in previous research.96 Although this 
finding is promising, it might be due to the way gender was 
manipulated. Previous research has used either written 
materials with pictures or video materials; the present 
studies used audio trials without pictures.97 Moreover, both 
the male and female defense attorneys read the same script, 
even though in real life speaking patterns of men and women 
frequently differ. Therefore, it is possible that any gender 
differences in judgments of the attorneys is not due directly 
to the gender, but to other associated characteristics that 
were held constant in this study, such as attractiveness, 
gender conformity, speech style, or mannerisms. 
Despite these findings, several caveats and limitations of 
this research must be mentioned. First, I designed this study 
to separate our understanding of the influence of objections 
from the influence of inadmissible evidence, but in reality, 
this is likely an artificial separation. In order to isolate 
objections, this study held all evidence constant without 
manipulating what was admitted. More research should be 
 
 95. The importance of this is twofold. First, the prosecutor was not the one 
objecting and there were no differences in ratings of the objecting attorney. 
Second, aggressiveness is a negative behavior generally (but might not be 
perceived as negatively in a legal context). Nevertheless, attorney aggressiveness 
did not predict verdict in any of the models. See infra Tables 1–3. Only attorney 
favorability mattered, which was unaffected by objections. 
 96. See EAGLY, supra note 48. 
 97. This was done intentionally so as not to create a confound with attorney 
characteristics, such as attractiveness, professionalism, or hand gestures. Jurors 
were able to make gender determinations based off audio alone, and only jurors 
who correctly identified attorney gender were included in the analyses. 
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done to parse out how objections and inadmissible evidence 
jointly and separately influence jurors.98 It would be 
particularly interesting to determine if the type of evidence 
objected to influences jurors, with the expectation that 
objections could draw more attention to particularly distinct 
(e.g., interesting, relevant, damaging) evidence. 
Second, future research should further investigate the 
influence of objection frequency in relation to juror 
expectations. In these studies, jurors did rate the high 
frequency conditions as higher in frequency than the low 
frequency conditions (indicating a successful manipulation); 
however, the high frequency objections were only rated at 
roughly the midpoint of the scale. High frequency 
interruptions were rated as occurring more frequently, 
despite occurring at the same rate. Therefore, it is possible 
jurors are expecting objections during trial, so it will take 
more objections to be considered high frequency. It is possible 
that extremely high frequency objections (e.g., objections 
after nearly every question) could be more annoying or result 
in more negative attributions and have the negative 
consequences attorneys fear. 
Third, this study isolated defense attorney objections, 
but jurors believed that both sides objected. Moreover, the 
non-objecting attorney was rated as more aggressive. In a 
real trial, both sides can object. Therefore, future research 
should assess what happens when both sides object. Does it 
balance perceptions out, or do jurors have variable 
expectations based on the side the attorney is representing? 
Finally, research needs to assess the influence of judicial 
rulings. Here, the balance of judicial rulings was held 
constant (66% overruled); however, it is possible to have 
rulings completely in support of one side. In actual trials, 
jurors are usually instructed that the judge’s rulings should 
 
 98. For example, Wilson, supra note 15, at 3–4 found that including an 
objection drew more attention to inadmissible evidence than when the evidence 
was excluded at the end of the trial without an objection. 
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not be interpreted as support for one side over the other, but 
as with limiting instructions, jurors might not be able to 
follow this instruction. Is the jury more likely to agree with 
a side if the judicial rulings appear to completely support it 
(particularly if the judge’s tone or actual words indicate 
frustration with the other either for continually objecting or 
attempting to present evidence that is being objected to)? 
B. Should Attorneys Object? 
Imagine again that you are a criminal defense attorney 
and the prosecuting attorney brings up evidence of your 
client’s prior criminal record in violation of the jurisdiction’s 
rules of evidence—do you object? In making this immediate 
decision, you probably quickly weigh the costs and benefits. 
On the one hand, there are a number of benefits to timely 
objections, including preventing the jury from hearing the 
evidence, preserving the record, and getting another 
opportunity to persuade the jury.99 On the other hand, there 
are several feared consequences of legal folklore; however, 
these fears are not empirically supported. In fact, the results 
of the two studies presented in this Article demonstrate 
either no effect or a somewhat positive effect of objecting. 
More research is necessary to investigate more nuanced 
situations, but in general, the objection alone is not 
negatively influencing jurors. Therefore, your decision 
probably should weigh in favor of objecting. 
Another consideration in favor of objecting is that in 
some instances, objections might actually be required. 
Attorneys have certain duties to their clients, including 
zealous representation100 and competency,101 which might 
 
 99. See supra Section I.A for a discussion of the benefits. 
 100. Rules may vary by jurisdiction, but most have adopted a version of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct which imposes a duty for attorneys to act 
zealously in representation of their clients. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 
Preamble ¶ 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017). 
 101. “A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent 
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation 
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include objecting at trial. Although objections are not 
specified as required in most instances,102 under tort law, a 
lawyer may be sued for malpractice if they breach one of the 
duties and it causes damage to his or her client. In terms of 
professional conduct, attorneys might breach the duty of 
competency if they do not object when a reasonable attorney 
would have.103 
It must also be noted that although concerns about 
objections have not been empirically supported, concerns 
about jurors being unable to disregard inadmissible evidence 
have been supported. Thus, objections should be made early, 
not just in order to be considered timely, but also to 
preemptively stop the jury from hearing the evidence if 
possible. Courts104 and researchers105 alike have found that 
the use of limiting instructions to cure the prejudicial impact 
of inadmissible evidence is often ineffective. Some 
researchers have even found that strong limiting 
instructions can backfire and increase the prejudicial impact 
of the evidence.106 Therefore, attorneys should do everything 
possible, including early objections, to prevent the jury from 
hearing the questionable evidence. 
 
reasonably necessary for the representation.” See id. at r. 1.1. Objecting at the 
proper time could be considered to be part of the required knowledge and skill. 
 102. One exception, in some jurisdictions, is that attorneys might explicitly be 
required to raise reasonable objections to prevent another party from obtaining 
confidential information. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 
§ 63 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2000). 
 103. Although these cases might be difficult because of challenges proving 
either cause and/or damage (i.e., a client might have to demonstrate they would 
have been successful but-for the attorney’s failure to object), the Seventh Circuit 
has found ineffective counsel for an attorney’s failure to object to unduly 
suggestive identifications. Cossel v. Miller, 229 F.3d 649, 654 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 104. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). 
 105. See, e.g., Lieberman & Arndt, supra note 19. 
 106. See, e.g., Cox & Tanford, supra note 19, at 31; Kramer et al., supra note 
19, at 430; Wolf & Montgomery, supra note 19, at 206–09. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The results of these studies indicate that, when in doubt, 
in most instances attorneys should favor objecting over 
sitting quietly. It is better to err on the side of preventing 
evidence from being admitted or preserving the record than 
to fear jury alienation. But legal lore is difficult to overcome 
even with empirical evidence. Therefore, if you still fear that 
objecting will alienate the jury (despite lack of empirical 
support), you should, at least, attempt to object pre-trial. 
Although juror perceptions of the attorneys are important, 
evidence is the driving factor behind verdict. It is important 
to prevent juries from hearing prejudicial, inadmissible 
evidence, particularly because they struggle with 
disregarding such evidence after they have heard it. 
Therefore, if you do not want to object during trial and you 
predict that the other side might attempt to admit 
inadmissible, prejudicial evidence, file a motion in limine to 
attempt to block such evidence ahead of trial; and if that does 
not work (or you cannot predict what will be brought up)—
object! 
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APPENDIX: REGRESSION TABLES 
TABLE 1. Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for 
Verdict based on Interruption and Sample. 
 Summary of Results (N = 208) 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B) 
Step 1       
Interruption 0.27 0.37 0.56 1 0.46 1.31 
Audience 0.49 0.30 2.79 1 0.10 1.64 
Constant -0.29      
Step 2       
Interruption 3.20 1.19 7.29 1 0.07 24.62 
Audience 2.18 0.76 8.24 1 0.04 8.82 
Interruption x Audience -2.09 0.83 6.36 1 0.01 0.12 
Constant -2.62      
Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (2) = 3.50, p = 0.12; -2 Log 
likelihood = 263.54; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.02. 
Step 2: Goodness of Fit X2(3) = 10.78, p = 0.01; -2 Log 
likelihood = 256.26; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.05; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.07. 
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TABLE 2. Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for 
Verdict based on Interruption Type, Frequency, 
and Audience. 
 Summary of Results (N = 166) 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B) 
Step 1       
Interruption Type -0.13 0.33 0.15 1 0.70 0.88 
Interruption Frequency 0.09 0.33 0.08 1 0.78 1.10 
Audience 0.02 0.33 0.00 1 0.96 1.02 
Constant 0.75      
Step 2       
Interruption Type 0.16 1.49 0.01 1 0.92 1.17 
Interruption Frequency 0.69 1.50 0.21 1 0.64 2.00 
Audience -1.26 1.39 0.82 1 0.37 0.29 
Type x Frequency -0.72 .66 1.18 1 0.28 0.49 
Type x Audience 0.51 0.66 0.60 1 0.44 1.67 
Frequency x Audience 0.32 0.66 0.23 1 0.63 1.38 
Constant 1.08      
Step 3       
Interruption Type 3.35 3.44 0.95 1 0.33 28.50 
Interruption Frequency 3.95 3.52 1.26 1 0.26 51.87 
Audience 1.82 3.28 0.31 1 0.58 6.15 
Type x Frequency -2.86 2.19 1.71 1 0.19 0.06 
Type x Audience -1.54 2.09 0.54 1 0.46 0.22 
Frequency x Audience -1.77 2.14 0.69 1 0.41 0.17 
Type x Frequency x Audience 1.38 1.34 1.06 1 0.30 3.99 
Constant -3.71      
Step 4       
Interruption Type 3.92 4.30 .83 1 0.36 50.17 
Interruption Frequency 5.46 4.59 1.42 1 0.23 234.07 
Audience 2.24 4.20 0.28 1 0.59 9.37 
Type x Frequency -3.50 2.80 1.56 1 0.21 0.03 
Type x Audience -1.51 2.64 0.33 1 0.57 0.22 
Frequency x Audience -2.12 2.81 0.57 1 0.45 0.12 
Type x Frequency x Audience 1.39 1.73 0.65 1 0.42 4.03 
Prosecutor Favorability -2.16 0.38 31.49 1 0.00 0.17 
Defense Favorability 1.89 0.35 29.61 1 0.00 6.60 
Constant -3.86      
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TABLE 2. (Continued) Summary of Logistic Regression 
Analysis for Verdict based on Interruption 
Type, Frequency, and Audience. 
 Summary of Results (N = 166) 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B) 
Step 5       
Interruption Type 3.81 4.35 0.77 1 0.38 45.15 
Interruption Frequency 5.21 4.2 1.27 1 0.26 183.02 
Audience 1.86 4.27 0.19 1 0.66 6.44 
Type x Frequency -3.45 2.82 1.50 1 0.22 0.03 
Type x Audience -1.45 2.68 0.29 1 0.59 0.23 
Frequency x Audience -1.97 2.83 0.48 1 0.49 0.14 
Type x Frequency x Audience 1.39 1.75 0.63 1 0.43 4.00 
Prosecutor Favorability -2.14 0.39 30.46 1 0.00 0.12 
Defense Favorability 1.91 0.35 29.75 1 0.00 6.77 
Prosecutor Aggressiveness 0.17 0.21 0.67 1 0.41 1.18 
Defense Aggressiveness -0.20 0.22 0.85 1 0.36 0.82 
Constant -3.39      
Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (3) = 0.23, p = 0.97; -2 Log 
likelihood = 216.05; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.00; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.00. Step 
2: Goodness of Fit X2(6) = 2.46, p = 0.87; -2 Log likelihood = 213.82; Cox 
& Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.02. Step 3: Goodness of Fit 
X2(7) = 3.53, p = 0.83; -2 Log likelihood = 212.74; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02; 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.03. Step 4: Goodness of Fit X2(9) = 75.96, p < 0.001; 
-2 Log likelihood = 140.32; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.36; Nagelkerke 
R2 = 0.50. Step 5: Goodness of Fit X2(11) = 79.91, p < 0.001; -2 Log 
likelihood = 212.74; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.02; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.03 
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TABLE 3. Summary of Logistic Regression Analysis for 
Verdict based on Objection Frequency and 
Defense Attorney Gender. 
 Summary of Results (N = 166) 
Variable B S.E. Wald df Sig exp(B) 
Step 1       
Objection Frequency -0.12 0.23 0.26 1 0.61 0.89 
Defense Gender 0.36 0.39 0.86 1 0.35 1.44 
Constant 0.64      
Step 2       
Objection Frequency -0.05 0.31 0.02 1 0.88 0.95 
Defense Gender 0.53 0.62 0.73 1 0.39 1.70 
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.17 0.47 0.12 1 0.73 0.85 
Constant 0.57      
Step 3       
Objection Frequency -0.02 0.40 0.00 1 0.96 0.98 
Defense Gender 1.07 0.81 1.75 1 0.19 2.92 
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.75 0.67 1.30 1 0.26 0.47 
Prosecutor Favorability -2.31 0.48 23.24 1 0.00 0.10 
Defense Favorability 1.88 0.45 17.90 1 0.00 6.57 
Constant 3.06      
Step 4       
Objection Frequency 0.04 0.42 0.01 1 .93 1.04 
Defense Gender 0.98 0.81 1.47 1 .23 2.66 
Frequency x Defense Gender -0.69 0.67 1.07 1 .30 0.50 
Prosecutor Favorability -2.33 0.50 22.15 1 0.00 0.10 
Defense Favorability 1.91 0.45 18.18 1 0.00 6.74 
Prosecutor Aggressiveness -0.25 0.28 0.84 1 0.36 0.78 
Defense Aggressiveness 0.08 0.23 0.11 1 0.74 1.08 
Constant 3.59      
Note: Step 1: Goodness of Fit X2 (2) = 1.08, p = 0.58; -2 Log 
likelihood = 151.68; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.01; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.01. Step 
2: Goodness of Fit X2(3) = 1.21, p = 0.75; -2 Log likelihood = 151.56; 
Cox & Snell R2 = 0.01; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.01. Step 3: Goodness of Fit 
X2(5) = 60.07, p < 0.001; -2 Log likelihood = 92.70; Cox & Snell 
R2 = 0.39; Nagelkerke R2 = 0.55. Step 4: Goodness of Fit X2(7) = 61.00, 
p < 0.001; -2 Log likelihood = 91.76; Cox & Snell R2 = 0.40; 
Nagelkerke R2 = 0.55. 
